Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
A s the nation's largest cash transfer program for low and moderate income families, the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) delivers over $38 billion annually to nearly 22 million households. The program has been heralded for its anti-poverty effectiveness, lifting more than four million people out of poverty each year, including well over two million children. 1 The dramatic expansion of EITC benefi ts during the 1990s was a hallmark of the Clinton Administration's welfare reform initiatives. Expansions of the program in recent years have been more modest; however, the EITC continues to have rather broad support from across the political spectrum. While popular, the program has been plagued by persistent compliance problems, with millions of claimants each year receiving benefi ts to which they are not entitled. For instance, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) study of EITC claims on tax year 1999 returns (Internal Revenue Service, 2002) reports excess claims of between $9.65 billion and $11.12 billion, representing from 30.9 percent to 35.5 percent of total claims.
In this paper, we undertake an econometric analysis of the factors that infl uence EITC participation and compliance using a unique administrative data source that contains detailed information on eligible and ineligible claimants as well as eligible non-claimants. This information is based on random IRS examinations that were conducted of both fi lers and nonfi lers of federal individual income tax returns.
Participation in the EITC requires fi ling an individual income tax return and completing the application for the credit that is included on the return. To our knowledge, ours is the fi rst study to explicitly measure the impact of credit eligibility on a household's propensity to fi le a return. It is also the fi rst to assess the determinants of whether an eligible fi ler actually claims the EITC. This is important, because hundreds of thousands of eligible fi lers fail to claim the credit each year.
Ineligible households made over onethird of all EITC claims in tax year 1988, and claims by ineligible households remain a signifi cant problem today. In our econometric analysis, we explore what factors drive ineligible households to claim the EITC. In contrast to prior econometric work in this area, we examine whether households that meet some (but not all) of the conditions required for the credit are relatively more likely to submit an improper claim. Our hypothesis is that such households are more likely to misperceive that they are eligible for the EITC than households that clearly do not meet any of the eligibility requirements. Moreover, some households that are inclined to cheat may perceive that satisfying at least some of the program requirements will permit them to feign that their transgression was an "honest error" in the event that they are caught.
Our study is also unique in that we examine the impact of tax practitioners on EITC participation and compliance. Over 60 percent of all EITC claimants use some form of paid or unpaid assistance in preparing their returns. Given their expertise and the extensive reliance of households on their services, tax practitioners have the potential to yield very substantial influence on EITC participation and compliance behavior. Yet little is known about the actual extent to which practitioners promote participation among eligible families or discourage improper claims among ineligible households. To learn about these issues, we perform a joint econometric analysis of the decisions whether to fi le a federal income tax return, seek preparation assistance, and/or claim the EITC.
Our econometric analysis focuses on households that are legally obliged to fi le a tax return-a group that represents an estimated three-fourths of the overall EITC-eligible population. The chief disadvantage of our data is that they pertain to tax year 1988. Although this enhances comparability with several key studies of EITC participation and compliance that were based on data of a similar vintage, the EITC program has changed in a number of important ways in more recent years. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis is still relevant for understanding the incentives facing households to participate and comply with tax administered benefi t programs, and for measuring the degree to which households respond to those incentives. We are able to show, for example, that our model is successful in capturing the impact of the various substantial program changes between tax years 1988 and 1999 on the propensity for eligible households to fi le and claim the EITC.
Although our econometric analysis focuses on households with a legal fi ling requirement, we use supplemental survey information to develop estimates of EITC participation rates for households both with and without a fi ling obligation. Our results provide new insight into the higher overall participation rate of the EITC vis-à-vis more traditional welfare programs, and they cast doubt on the notion that the EITC is universally more effective in reaching needy families.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by providing a brief overview of the EITC program. Next, we present our econometric framework for jointly analyzing the decisions whether to fi le a federal individual income tax return, whether to seek preparation assistance, and whether to claim the EITC. We then describe our data, and present and interpret the results of our econometric analysis. Estimates are then developed of the overall EITC participation rates for households with and without a legal fi ling obligation. Next, we use our econometric results to simulate the effects of the dramatic expansion in EITC benefi ts and other changes between tax years 1988 and 1999 on the level of program participation. The fi nal section offers some concluding remarks. An appendix provides supplementary information on our simulation methodology.
OVERVIEW OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
In this section, we provide a brief overview of essential features of the EITC for purposes of our analysis. For a more detailed discussion of the program, we refer the reader to Ventry (2000) or Hotz and Scholz (2003) .
The federal tax system has included an Earned Income Tax Credit since 1975. Originally set up to offset the employer and employee portions of the payroll tax for low-and moderate-income working families, the credit was subject to major expansions in 1986, 1990, and 1993 , as well as a more modest expansion in 2001. The EITC is administered as a refundable tax credit, which means that a family receives the full value of the credit even if the credit amount exceeds the family's income tax liability.
The value of the credit varies with a family's earned income. Beginning at the low end of the income distribution, the value of the credit first increases with earned income, then levels off, and then declines until it ultimately has been phased out altogether once income reaches a specifi ed threshold. For example, in tax year 1988-the year of the data used in our econometric analysis-an eligible household with one or more qualifying children received a 14 percent credit over its fi rst $6,225 of earned income, at which point the credit reached a maximum of $874. The credit then remained level until earned income exceeded $9,850, whereafter it was phased out at a rate of ten percent, until it disappeared entirely once earned income or adjusted gross income (AGI) reached $18,576.
2 By tax year 1999-the year of our simulation of program participation-the real value of the credit had increased substantially, been indexed to infl ation, and varied according to the number of qualifying children in the household. In this year, an eligible household with one qualifying child received a 34 percent credit over its fi rst $6,800 of income, at which point the credit reached a maximum of $2,312. The credit then remained level until earned income exceeded $12,460, whereafter it was phased out at a rate of 15.98 percent, until it disappeared entirely once earned income or a modifi ed defi nition of AGI reached $26,928. The credit was substantially larger for an eligible household with two or more qualifying children, providing a maximum benefi t of $3,816.
Prior to 1990, the credit was restricted to households whose federal fi ling status was either married fi ling joint (and claiming a dependent child), head of household, or surviving spouse. While familiar and deceptively simple, these different fi ling statuses unfortunately implied different eligibility criteria, breeding confusion and inequity. For example, a married couple could qualify if it provided over half of the costs of supporting a child, regardless of whether that child resided with or was even related to the couple (e.g., a foster child). In contrast, a head of household had to provide over half of the larger costs of maintaining a household in which a child resided, a requirement that many divorced mothers could not meet (Yin, 1996) . On the other hand, a widowed or divorced parent could qualify even if her son or daughter was a self-supporting adult (Holtzblatt, 1991) . Responding to these anomalies, Congress in 1990 adopted a uniform defi nition of family responsibility, limiting the credit to those households with a child of a certain age and relationship who resided with the fi ler for more than half of the year.
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Since tax year 1994, a small credit has also been available for working individuals with no children. However, our analysis of the EITC concerns only the portion of the credit that applies to families with children.
ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop an econometric model of EITC participation and compliance that accounts for how eligible and ineligible households make decisions regarding whether to fi le a return, seek tax preparation assistance, and/or claim the EITC.
Encouraging program participation is always an important objective in administering social welfare programs. In the case of a refundable tax credit program, such as the EITC, the principal challenge is to encourage low-income families to fi le a federal income tax return so that they can receive their benefi ts. However, a significant number of eligible fi lers also fail to participate in the EITC by not claiming the credit on their returns. In contrast to previous EITC research that has focused exclusively on fi ling behavior, our econometric framework allows us to jointly examine the determinants of whether a household fi les a return and whether it claims the EITC.
Another important objective in administering social welfare programs is to discourage ineligible households from claiming benefits. We, therefore, build into our econometric framework an analysis of the factors that lead to the submission of EITC claims by ineligible households.
Although a large percentage of households rely on tax practitioners for assistance with understanding and claiming the EITC, past research has not addressed the potentially infl uential role that tax practitioners may play in either promoting participation among eligible households or discouraging improper claims among those who are ineligible. To explore these issues, we jointly model the decision whether to seek tax preparation assistance with the decisions whether to fi le and claim the EITC.
Our specifi cation includes four equations:
represents a probit specification of the fi ling decision. The latent variable F* represents the propensity for the household to fi le a federal individual income tax return. A return is fi led if and only if F* ≥ 0.
Prior econometric studies have not accounted for the impact of EITC eligibility on fi ling behavior. In our specifi cation, we explicitly include the amount of the credit to which a household is entitled (which, for ineligible households, is zero) as a regressor. This variable (A) controls for the possibility that EITC-eligible households are relatively more likely to fi le a return, and it makes it possible for us to measure the responsiveness of fi ling to the magnitude of the credit. The symbol X F refers to a vector of additional explanatory variables, and ε F is a random normal disturbance term.
Each of the remaining equations is relevant only if the household elects to fi le a tax return. Equation [2] represents a probit specifi cation of the fi ler's decision whether to seek assistance in preparing the return. The latent variable P* represents the propensity for the household to seek assistance. We observe:
The term E represents a dummy variable for EITC eligibility and is defi ned as follows:
We include E as a regressor to account for the possibility that eligible households have a different propensity to seek tax assistance than ineligible households. For instance, eligible households may seek assistance specifi cally to learn how to apply for the credit. 4 The symbol X P refers to a vector of additional explanatory variables, and ε P is a random normal disturbance term.
Equations [3] and [4] represent probit specifi cations for the decision to claim the credit for eligible and ineligible households, respectively. Our model amounts to an (exogenous) switching framework in which a household's decision whether to claim the credit is dictated by either equation [3] or equation [4] , depending on whether the eligibility dummy E equals one or zero. We include the preparation mode dummy P as a regressor in these equations to explore whether tax practitioners effectively promote EITC participation among eligible households and/or discourage claims among ineligible households. To allow for the possibility that different factors infl uence claims by eligible and ineligible households, we specify distinct vectors of additional explanatory variables (X CE and X CNE ) and disturbance terms (ε CE and ε CNE ) for the two equations.
As is standard in probit specifi cations, we normalize the standard deviation of each of the disturbance terms in equations [1] through [4] to one. When modeling the decision whether to seek tax preparation assistance, it is important to recognize that households are not randomly assigned to a mode of tax preparation. Rather, they make their own choices. As a consequence, households that employ tax assistance may differ in unobserved ways from households that prepare their own returns. To control for possible sample selection, we allow free correlations (ρ FP , ρ PCE , and ρ PCNE ) between the preparation mode disturbance (ε P ) and the disturbances of the fi ling (ε F ) and claiming (ε CE and ε CNE ) equations. We also allow free correlations (ρ FCE and ρ FCNE ) between the disturbances of the fi ling and claiming equations to account for the possibility that unobserved factors that influence 1 if return preparation assistance is employed; 0 otherwise. { { 1 if the household is eligible for the EIC; 0 otherwise. the fi ling decision (e.g., awareness of the EITC) are also related to the decision to claim the credit.
Model Identifi cation
Technically, our model would be identifi ed, even in the absence of any exclusion restrictions, on the basis of the functional form and distributional assumptions we have imposed. However, it is clearly desirable to have a stronger basis for identification than this. As described below, we, therefore, impose certain exclusion restrictions to ensure that our model is identifi ed under more general conditions.
Since households are observed in our data sample whether they file or not, no exclusion restrictions are needed to improve the identifi cation of the fi ling equation. Likewise, we observe whether a tax practitioner has been used, regardless of whether the household claims the EITC. So, it is not necessary to exclude any of the regressors used in the claiming equations from the preparation mode equation. However, since we only observe whether a tax practitioner has been used if the household has fi led a return, it is desirable for identifi cation purposes to exclude at least one of the fi ling equation regressors from the preparation mode equation. For this same reason, it is desirable to exclude at least one of the fi ling equation regressors from each of the claiming equations. The regressors we have chosen to exclude from these equations are described below in our Results section.
DATA
The administrative data set we have compiled for this study has some important advantages over the survey and tax return data sources used in prior EITC studies. First, our data provide a direct indicator of whether a household actually claimed the credit. In contrast, prior researchers (Scholz, 1994 and 1996; Liebman, 1996 and were able to infer participation only indirectly on the basis of whether an apparently eligible household fi led a tax return. The distinction between fi ling and participation is an important one, because many eligible fi lers fail to claim the credit.
Second, we believe that our data allow us to assess EITC eligibility more accurately, which could lead to improved inferences about program take-up. Past studies of EITC participation have relied on national surveys, such as the Current Population Survey or the Survey of Income and Program Participation, to assess eligibility. This can be a daunting task, as it is diffi cult to assign fi ling status (particularly head-of-household status), to test for support of a child (or, post-1990 , for the length of time the child resided in the household), and to measure adjusted gross income based on the available information. Moreover, there is no assurance that the millions of households that apparently misrepresent their EITC eligibility on their tax returns each year will be inclined to provide correct information on a survey. It seems plausible that errors made in assigning EITC eligibility (exclusions of eligible households and inclusions of ineligible ones) on the basis of survey results may tend to cancel out to some extent in aggregate participation rate statistics. However, even if this is the case, the errors in identifying truly eligible households might still result in misleading inferences regarding the determinants of participation behavior.
For our measure of EITC eligibility, we rely on the determination of an experienced IRS examiner who has performed a thorough audit of the household's tax return. Even tax examiners, of course, can fail to detect some improper claims. Further, some truly eligible households may have diffi culty in substantiating their credit claim during an audit, perhaps due to poor record keep-ing. 5 Overall, though, we feel our measure of eligibility represents a substantial improvement over the survey-based measures used in prior studies.
A disadvantage of our data is that we have access to only limited demographic information, such as marital status, whether the taxpayer is over 65 years of age, number of dependents, occupation, and state of residence. Therefore, we are unable to control for the impact of such factors as education, race, or receipt of public assistance on EITC participation and compliance.
Our data concerning fi lers and nonfi lers have been derived from two separate data sets. The data for fi lers are taken from the IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) Phase III Survey. This survey contains the results of intensive line-by-line audits of a stratifi ed random sample of approximately 54,000 individual income tax returns for tax year 1988. For most line items, both the amount that was reported by the fi ler and the amount that the examiner determined should have been reported are available. In addition, information is recorded about the prior fi ling history of the household, and a code is available for the primary fi ler's occupational category. The occupation code has been recorded by the IRS examiner, based on his assessment of the fi ler's main line of work. The data permit us to identify whether a fi ler claimed the EITC and, if so, whether his claim was accepted or rejected during the audit. For fi lers who did not claim the credit, we are able to identify whether they were granted the credit by the examiner. A set of sample weights is included to make the data representative of the national return population.
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For our econometric analysis, we restrict our attention to households in the TCMP data sample that were required to fi le a tax year 1988 return. We do this to ensure consistency with our data on nonfi lers, which is complete only for those individuals who were legally required to fi le a return but failed to do so. To identify whether a household was required to fi le a return, we have developed an algorithm that tests whether any of the conditions that require fi ling a federal income tax return is satisfi ed. A household was required to fi le a return in tax year 1988 if its gross income (excluding nontaxable sources of income) exceeded a threshold, which varied according to age and marital status. For example, a single individual under 65 years of age was required to fi le a return if his gross income exceeded $4,950. In contrast, the threshold for a married couple with both spouses over 65 years of age was $10,100.
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From our TCMP fi ler sample of households with a fi ling requirement, we have drawn for our analysis all returns of households eligible for the EITC, as well as a subsample of the returns for house-5 For instance, the GAO (U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, 1993) estimates that, of all households in the 1988 TCMP that were denied a dependent claim on the basis of failing the support test, 43 percent failed as a result of not having adequate records to demonstrate whether they provided the necessary support. The GAO speculates that some of these households may have met the support test if they had kept adequate records. The study also reports fi nding 51 cases in a sample of 958 returns where there was a discrepancy between certain information reported on the TCMP audit checksheets and the information coded on the TCMP computer fi le.
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The TCMP fi ler population excludes returns that were fi led late as well as returns for non-resident taxpayers. In addition, the TCMP excludes those individuals who claimed a fi ling status other than married joint on their return, but were later assigned that fi ling status upon examination. We are, therefore, unable to examine the incidence of EITC compliance problems among such individuals in our analysis. McCubbin (2000) reports that about 7.8 percent of the total dollar value of EITC overclaims in tax year 1994 were made on returns involving a married joint fi ler who reported either head-of-household or single-fi ling status. 7 Special rules applied for individuals who were claimed as a dependent on another tax return; owed certain taxes (such as those on tips not reported to an employer); received advance EITC payments; had net earnings from self-employment of at least $400; or had wages of $100 or more from a church or qualifi ed church-controlled organization that was exempt from employer social security taxes.
holds that were not eligible. In particular, our sample includes all households that either claimed the EITC or received it following examination, as well as any other household with an AGI of $30,000 or less. However, to simplify the computational burden of our maximum likelihood estimation procedure, we have included only a random 25 percent subsample of all non-claimants possessing an AGI of more than $30,000. We have adjusted the sample weights accordingly. Our data on nonfi lers comes from the examination-based segment of the IRS TCMP Phase IX Nonfi ler Survey. Beginning with a stratifi ed random sample of 23,283 potential nonfi lers from a population of 83 million individuals for whom there was no record of a tax year 1988 individual income tax return being fi led, 8 revenue officers set out to locate each of the individuals in this sample to determine whether they should have fi led a return. A total of 18,689 of the 23,283 potential nonfilers were successfully located through the search process. The revenue offi cers had access to information documents and past fi ling records. Armed with this information, they conducted interviews or field visits to determine whether a successfully located individual was required to fi le a return, i.e., whether the "potential nonfiler" was a "true nonfi ler." Tax returns were secured from 3,546 individuals who were deemed to have been in violation of their tax fi ling requirements, and a random sample of 2,195 of these returns were subjected to intensive line-by-line audits, comparable to the audits performed for the TCMP Phase III study of individual return fi lers. We employ the details from these 2,195 examined returns in our analysis.
Since not all potential nonfi lers in the original sample of 23,283 were located, it is highly likely that a number of true nonfilers went unidentified, including some who would have been eligible for the EITC. To account for these unlocated true nonfilers, we have followed the same approach we used previously in our development of the IRS estimate of the nonfi ler tax gap from these data. The fi rst step is to perform a probit analysis of the likelihood that a potential nonfi ler can be located. The probit equation takes the form:
where X L represents a vector of regressors based on the information that was available to the revenue offi cer who attempted to locate the individual. Depending on the individual, information may have been available about the individual's age, whether a return had been filed for previous tax years, details concerning the individual's spouse, and details from information return documents. The parameter vector β L represents the coeffi cients to be estimated, and ε L is a standard normal disturbance term. The coeffi cients are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood and used to predict the probability that each individual can be located.
To make located true nonfi lers broadly representative of all true nonfi lers, we divide their original sample weights by their predicted chance of being located. The logic of this approach is as follows. Suppose members of a group of true nonfilers with similar characteristics each have a probability of, say, one half of being located. This suggests that for every member of the group that will be located, there is another member who will not be found. This is analogous to drawing a 50 percent random subsample of all members of the group. To make the located members representative of the entire group, the original sample weight of the located members is, therefore, divided by the implied sampling probability-in this case by one half. The interested reader is referred to Internal Revenue Service (1996, Appendix A) for further details on this approach.
In the aggregate, the expansion of sample weights using the above methodology increased our estimate of the number of EITC-eligible nonfi lers by only 8.1 percent. This suggests that most of the eligible households in the original sample of 23,283 nonfi lers were successfully located by the IRS revenue offi cers.
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION
In this section, we present the results of our analysis. We have estimated our econometric model using our sample of 32,601 households, including 30,406 fi lers and 2,195 nonfi lers. The raw and weighted sample sizes, broken down by fi ling status, EITC eligibility, and whether the credit was claimed, are summarized in Table 1 . We have estimated our model using the method of maximum likelihood. The likelihood function for our specifi cation is available on request. The standard errors of our parameter estimates have been adjusted to account for the choice-based structure of our sample using the formula presented in Manski and Lerman (1977) .
In those cases where there was a discrepancy in our data between the information originally reported on a return by the taxpayer and the information recorded by the examiner, we have constructed our explanatory variables using information recorded by the examiner, which we deem to be more accurate. Prior research has not measured the extent to which eligibility for the EITC impacts on the propensity to fi le a return. For instance, Scholz (1994) focused on fi ling behavior among households that appeared eligible for the credit based on their responses to survey questions regarding their income and demographic characteristics. His results, therefore, do not address whether eligible households are more likely to fi le a return than ineligible households. On the other hand, Erard and Ho (2001) explored fi ling behavior within a nationally representative sample containing both households that were eligible for the EITC and households that were not eligible. However, the authors did not include any regressors in their analysis to account for the additional incentive created by the EITC to fi le. In our specifi cation of the fi ling decision, we include essentially the same regressors employed by Erard and Ho (2001) . 9 This includes measures of past fi ling behavior, the presence of income that is subject to information reporting, the burden associated with fi ling a return, occupation, and demographic characteristics. However, we also include the magnitude of the credit available to eligible households that fi le a return and claim the EITC. For ineligible households, this variable is set equal to zero. With this additional regressor, we are able to assess whether eligible households are relatively more likely to claim the credit and measure how the propensity to fi le varies with the magnitude of the credit.
Description of Regressors
The decisions regarding preparation mode and whether to claim the EITC are only relevant if the household chooses to fi le a return. We assume that certain regressors which infl uence whether a household chooses to fi le a return have no direct impact on these other decisions. These include our dummies for the presence of income subject to information reporting, past fi ling behavior, occupation, and residence in a state that imposes an income tax. Although arguments can be made for the inclusion of some of these variables in our specifi cation of the preparation mode or claiming decisions, we believe that any infl uence of such variables is likely to be indirect, by way of their infl uence on fi ling behavior. Similarly, we account for the impact of the overall fi ling burden on the propensity to seek tax assistance, but we assume that the fi ling burden does not directly impact whether a fi ler claims the EITC. 10 As noted above, we assume that the propensity of an eligible household to claim the EITC is sensitive to the magnitude of the credit, but that the decision whether to seek tax assistance is primarily driven by whether the household is eligible for the credit.
Our specifi cations of the preparation mode decision and the EITC claiming decision for ineligible households include a broader set of fi ling status dummies than our specifi cations of the fi ling decision and the EITC claiming decision for eligible households. In the earlier study of fi ling behavior by Erard and Ho (2001) , married joint was the only fi ling status that was found to be statistically signifi cant. With regard to our EITC claiming specifi cation for eligible households, we do not include a broader set of fi ling status dummies, because households with single or married separate fi ling status were not permitted to take the credit.
Raw EITC participation rates estimated by Liebman (1996) vary according to whether a household is in the phase-in, plateau, or phase-out regions of the credit. To assess whether these differences persist even after controlling for the magnitude of the credit and other factors thought to influence participation, we include dummies for presence in the plateau and phase-out regions as regressors in our specifi cation of the claiming decision for eligible households.
For ineligible households, our EITC claiming equation includes dummies for whether a household meets certain key EITC eligibility requirements. Our hypothesis is that ineligible households that meet some of these requirements will be more prone to making improper claims. This may be due either to a higher propensity for unintentional errors or a belief among dishonest fi lers that any false claims discovered by the IRS are more likely to be perceived as unintentional errors in such cases. 9 Erard and Ho (2001) used a somewhat different econometric framework that led to the inclusion of an index of "locatability" in their fi ling specifi cation. As a proxy for this index, we include a dummy for whether the household has any income subject to information reporting. 10 Our measure of fi ling burden excludes the burden associated with completing the EITC application on the tax return.
As discussed above in our Econometric Framework section, certain of the above exclusion restrictions aid in the identifi cation of our model, but most of them are not needed for this purpose. More specifically, our fundamental exclusion restrictions for identifi cation purposes are the exclusion of our measures of fi ling burden and the presence of income subject to third-party information reporting from the equations describing the decision whether to claim the EITC, and the exclusion of the dummy for income subject to third-party information reporting from our tax preparation mode specifi cation.
Below, we discuss the results of our joint analysis of the decisions whether to fi le a return, to seek tax assistance, and to claim the EITC; results for the last decision are presented separately for eligible and ineligible households. Table 3 presents our estimated parameters for equation [1] , which concerns the decision whether to fi le a 1988 tax return among individuals with a legal filing requirement. To assist with interpretation, the table also includes the estimated marginal effects based on the weighted mean values of the explanatory variables in our sample. Most of our regressors are dummy variables. In the case of a dummy explanatory variable, the marginal effect is computed as the change in the probability of fi ling when the variable shifts from zero to one, holding all other regressors constant.
The Decision Whether to File
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Our results are qualitatively very similar to those found by Erard and Ho (2001) . Like this earlier study, the two most infl uential determinants of fi ling behavior in our analysis are whether the household fi led in the prior year, and whether the IRS has access to information that identifi es the household's address and whether it is likely to have a fi ling requirement. All else equal, we estimate that the likelihood of fi ling is 35 percentage points higher for a household that fi led in the prior year. Likewise, it is 28 percentage points higher for a household that has income that is subject to third-party information reporting. Our results are also consistent with Erard and Ho's (2001) fi ndings that the propensity to fi le varies across occupations, is relatively high among married couples, and declines with the magnitude of the fi ling burden (at least for households near the fi ling threshold).
In his analysis of fi ling behavior, Scholz (1994) restricted his attention to households that appeared eligible for the EITC. Relative to (seemingly) eligible fi lers, he found that (seemingly) eligible nonfi lers were entitled to a smaller credit; received more of their income from self-employment and social security; had larger families; and were relatively more likely to be unmarried, of Spanish origin, living in states with no income taxes, receiving public assistance, and working in household service occupations (e.g., as housekeepers or child care workers).
Like Scholz (1994) , we fi nd that married couples are more likely to fi le a return and that self-employed individuals are less likely to do so. However, some of Scholz' results are inconsistent with our findings. For instance, we fi nd no signifi cant relationship between the propensity to fi le and either the size of the family (as indicated by the number of dependents) or residence in a state with no income tax. Moreover, we fi nd that individuals working in service or administrative support occupations are more (not less) likely to fi le a return. We believe that these differences in results are largely attributable to differences in the populations covered by our respective analyses. For instance, whereas our sample contains both eligible and ineligible households, Scholz' sample contains only eligible households. Furthermore, whereas our sample is restricted to households with a legal fi ling requirement, Scholz' sample also contains households with no fi ling obligation.
In contrast to the studies by Scholz (1994) and Erard and Ho (2001) , we are able to assess the impact of EITC eligibility on a household's propensity to fi le. We estimate that an eligible household in tax year 1988 was entitled to an average credit of $521. Evaluated at the mean characteristics of our sample, we estimate that the likelihood of fi ling would be 1.1 percentage points higher for a household that was eligible for a credit of this amount than a household that was not eligible (99.0 percent compared to 97.9 percent). However, the estimated impact of the EITC on the propensity to fi le varies greatly with the characteristics of the household. For example, if we evaluate at the mean characteristics of our subsample of households that did not fi le a return for the prior tax year, being eligible for a credit of $521 raises the likelihood of fi ling by 11.7 percentage points (from 34.9 percent to 46.6 percent). Further evidence on the impact of the EITC on the propensity to fi le is presented below where we discuss the results of our simulation of the impact of the large expansion in the real value of the credit during the 1990s on program participation.
The estimated marginal effects presented for many of our explanatory variables in Table 3 are relatively small. To a substantial extent, this is also a consequence of their being evaluated at the weighted mean characteristics for the entire sample. The estimated probability of fi ling based on these mean characteristics is 98 percent. As discussed by Erard and Ho (2001) , the marginal effects tend to be much larger when evaluated at the mean characteristics of nonfi lers in the sample, who naturally have a substantially lower estimated fi ling probability. Table 4 presents our estimates of the parameters and marginal effects for equation [2] , which concerns the propensity of a fi ler to seek tax preparation assistance. Nearly 60 percent of the fi lers in our weighted sample used some form of assistance in preparing their returns.
The Decision Whether to Seek Tax Assistance
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The marginal effects are evaluated based on the weighted mean characteristics of our sample of 30,406 filers. 13 The estimated probability of using preparation assistance for an individual with these characteristics is 60.9 percent.
Although it seems likely that households would seek the assistance of tax experts to learn about how to apply for the EITC, past studies of tax preparation mode have not accounted for this possibility.
14 Other factors equal, we fi nd that the likelihood of seeking tax preparation assistance is about seven percentage points higher among households that are eligible for the EITC.
Our analysis also includes an approximate measure of the fi ling burden based on an IRS study conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. The measure is computed by aggregating the estimated average completion times (including the time needed for record-keeping and research) associated with each form and schedule used by the taxpayer. Thus, in essence, it is a weighted number of forms and schedules, where the weights are the estimated completion times. Our results indicate that households are relatively more likely to seek tax preparation assistance when the fi ling burden is high.
Past studies have not controlled directly for fi ling burden, but, instead, have relied on proxies such as the presence of self-employment or farm income and the number 12 This includes paid and unpaid assistance; the latter category includes unpaid preparers as well as volunteer and IRS assistance. 13 The dummy variables for fi ling status belong to a common group along with the omitted dummy for married joint status. The marginal effect for a dummy variable in this group is computed as the change in the probability of claiming the credit from when that variable is set equal to zero and all other dummies in the group are set equal to their sample mean values to when that variable is set equal to one and all other dummies in the group are set equal to zero. 14 Refer to Erard (1993 Erard ( , 1997 for discussions of prior studies on the use of tax practitioners. of forms and schedules that the fi ler needs to complete. Such studies have found that self-employed taxpayers and farmers are relatively more likely than other fi lers to seek tax preparation assistance. In contrast, after controlling explicitly for fi ling burden, we fi nd that the likelihood of seeking preparation assistance is about 22 percentage points lower for fi lers with self-employment or farm income than it is for other fi lers.
We fi nd that home ownership is also negatively associated with seeking tax preparation assistance. All else equal, the likelihood of using a preparer is about 13.5 percentage points lower for homeowners than it is for non-homeowners. In contrast, elderly, unmarried, and unemployed fi lers are relatively more likely to seek assistance. The level of adjusted gross income is not signifi cantly associated with tax preparation mode, although low-income taxpayers who are near the fi ling threshold are relatively less likely to seek preparation assistance so long as the fi ling burden is not unusually high.
The Decision Whether to Claim the EITC (Eligible Filers)
Table 5 presents our estimates of the parameters and marginal effects for equation [3] , which concerns the propensity of an eligible fi ler to claim the EITC. In our choice-based data sample, 2,564 of the 2,844 eligible fi lers actually claimed the credit. The marginal effects are evaluated based on the weighted mean characteristics of these 2,844 fi lers. 15 The estimated probability of claiming the credit, evaluated at the sample mean, is 93 percent.
The results in Table 5 indicate that the magnitude and range of the credit are more relevant than the level of adjusted gross income in explaining which fi lers will claim the EITC and, hence, participate in the program. Although somewhat imprecisely estimated, the predicted 15 The plateau and phase-out region dummy variables belong to a common group along with the omitted dummy for the phase-in region of the credit. The marginal effect for a dummy variable in a group is computed as the change in the probability of claiming the credit from when that variable is set equal to zero and all other dummies in the group are set equal to their sample mean values to when that variable is set equal to one and all other dummies in the group are set equal to zero. likelihood of submitting a claim is about three percentage points higher for eligible households whose income is in the plateau range of the credit (where the credit achieves its maximum value) than for households in the phase-in range. In addition, the propensity to submit a claim responds positively to the magnitude of the credit. Together, these fi ndings indicate that the decision to claim the EITC is driven to an important extent by fi nancial incentives. While the results also indicate that elderly individuals and households with self-employment or farm income are relatively less likely to claim a credit to which they are entitled, the standard errors indicate that the parameter estimates for these variables are very imprecise. Residence in a state that administers its own earned income tax credit has only a very small and statistically insignifi cant impact on the likelihood of claiming the credit.
The estimated coefficient of the tax preparation assistance dummy is negative, but statistically insignifi cant, suggesting that tax practitioners are not effective in promoting EITC participation among eligible households. The estimated correlation term ρ PCE indicates that eligible households that seek assistance have unobserved characteristics that make them relatively more prone to claiming the credit than households that prepare their own returns. These results contrast sharply with what one would fi nd in a standard cross-sectional model that did not account for self-selection of tax preparation mode. For instance, if the correlation ρ PCE is restricted to zero in estimation-as it would implicitly be in such a model-the constrained estimate of the preparation assistance dummy coeffi cient becomes positive and signifi cant, indicating that tax practitioners do improve participation in the EITC among eligible households. Thus, the interpretation of the role of tax practitioners in promoting EITC participation depends critically on whether one accounts for unobserved heterogeneity between taxpayers who seek preparation assistance and taxpayers who prepare their own returns.
The estimated correlation between the disturbances of the fi ling and claiming equations ρ FCE is negative, but statistically insignifi cant. This suggests that if eligible nonfi lers were in fact to submit a return, their propensity to claim the credit might mirror that of eligible fi lers with similar observed characteristics.
The Decision Whether to Claim the EITC (Ineligible Filers)
Table 6 presents our estimated parameters and marginal effects for equation [4] , which concerns the propensity of an ineligible fi ler to improperly claim the EITC. In our choice-based sample, 1,520 of the 27,562 ineligible fi lers claimed the credit. The marginal effects are evaluated based on the weighted mean characteristics of these 27,562 fi lers. 16 Our weighted results indicate that over one-third of the 10.3 million fi lers claiming the EITC in tax year 1988 were ineligible for the credit.
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As discussed above in our Description of Regressors subsection, our hypothesis is that ineligible households that satisfy some of the key EITC eligibility tests are more likely to submit an improper claim 16 The fi ling status dummies in our specifi cation belong to a common group along with the omitted dummy for married joint status. The marginal effect for a dummy variable in this group is computed as the change in the probability of claiming the credit from when that variable is set equal to zero and all other dummies in the group are set equal to their sample mean values to when that variable is set equal to one and all other dummies in the group are set equal to zero. 17 This statistic includes all claimants, regardless of whether they were required to fi le. According to our TCMP tabulations, claimants with a fi ling requirement submitted 85.2 percent of all claims (eligible and ineligible combined) and 81.5 percent of ineligible claims.
for the credit than households that satisfy none of the tests. The results confi rm that ineligible fi lers who pass the income test are much more likely to fi le a claim than those who do not. Similarly, the estimated parameter of the child-at-home test dummy indicates that those who pass the child-at-home test are relatively more likely to submit an improper claim. A fi ler who satisfi es both the income and child-at-home tests may, nonetheless, be ineligible for the credit. For example, she would not have been eligible in tax year 1988 if her fi ling status was single or married fi ling separately; if she had claimed an exclusion for foreign-earned income; or if she was a non-custodial parent who had been granted the right to claim the dependent exemption under a divorce arrangement. The estimated interaction term parameter indicates that an ineligible filer who passes both the income and child-at-home tests is especially likely to claim the credit. Relative to a household that passes neither test, the likelihood of submitting an improper EITC claim is about 20 percentage points higher for a household that satisfi es the conditions of both tests.
The level of adjusted gross income has no signifi cant impact on the likelihood of improperly claiming the EITC, once the income test for the credit is accounted for. However, single individuals, elderly fi lers, and homeowners are all relatively less likely to claim a credit to which they are not entitled, while married separate and unemployed fi lers are relatively more likely to submit an improper claim. Residence in a state that administers its own earned income tax credit program has a small positive, but statistically insignificant impact on the likelihood that an ineligible household will claim the credit.
The estimated coefficient of our tax preparation assistance dummy is positive and signifi cant, indicating that the use of tax practitioners actually led to a higher incidence of improper EITC claims in tax year 1988. The negative value of the estimated correlation coefficient ρ PCNE indicates that the ineligible clients of tax practitioners had unobserved characteristics that made them relatively less prone to submit a claim for the EITC than ineligible fi lers who prepared their own returns. If this correlation term is restricted to zero, the constrained coeffi cient estimate for This fi nding is perhaps not so surprising. Prior to tax year 1997, tax practitioners had no legal obligation to verify that the information reported by their clients in support of an EITC claim was legitimate. Moreover, they had a fi nancial incentive not to probe too deeply into the veracity of client claims. For instance, many tax practitioners earned (and continue to earn) additional money from EITC clients by facilitating "refund anticipation loans," whereby the client receives a loan (often at a very high effective rate of interest) in anticipation of and secured by the client's EITC or income tax refund. Since these loans were granted only after the practitioner received an electronic confi rmation from the IRS that the credit had been approved, there was little fi nancial risk associated with submitting EITC claims that might be somewhat questionable.
In response to concerns about improper EITC claims on returns prepared by tax practitioners, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 introduced new due diligence requirements for tax preparers. Under these requirements, preparers are required to solicit certain information from taxpayers pertaining to their EITC eligibility and retain this information for a period of three years. The preparer is also required to make reasonable inquiries to resolve cases where any information furnished by a client or otherwise known to the preparer appears incorrect, inconsistent, or incomplete. The preparer penalty for not complying with these requirements is $100 per case.
The estimated correlation between the filing equation and claiming equation disturbances ρ FCNE is positive and significant, indicating that unobserved factors that increase the odds of fi ling are associated with a higher incidence of improper credit claims.
In our analysis, we have made no attempt to assess the extent to which noncompliant behavior is deliberate. However, this issue has been explored by McCubbin (2000) and Liebman (1995 Liebman ( , 1996 , in terms of misreporting of children, and, with contrasting results, by Joulfaian and Rider (1996) , in terms of misreporting of income. McCubbin and Liebman each find that the propensity to incorrectly claim a qualifying child for the EITC rises with the size of the credit, which they take as evidence that at least some share of incorrect child claims (at least 28 percent in the case of McCubbin; at least 32 percent in the case of Liebman) is deliberate. 19 In contrast, Joulfaian and Rider fi nd that, with the exception of sole proprietors, there is no signifi cant relationship between either the likelihood or magnitude of income misreporting and the size of the EITC (as refl ected by the marginal tax rate), suggesting that income misreporting errors are generally unintentional.
The rate of noncompliance with the EITC appears to be high relative to the rates observed in more traditional U.S. welfare programs. For example, estimated overclaim rates for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food 18 This fi nding is consistent with more recent evidence from an IRS study of EITC noncompliance in tax year 1994. As reported by the U.S. General Accounting Offi ce (1998), EITC overclaim rates were found in that study to be approximately the same (26 percent) on self-prepared returns and those completed by preparers. 19 While the responsiveness of child reporting errors to the size of the credit may very well be an indication of deliberate reporting errors, an alternative explanation would be that unintentional errors actually are more prevalent when the credit is large. For instance, the level of awareness may be higher when the credit is made more generous, and households with honest intentions may be more willing to tolerate the burden of fi ling and claiming the credit in this case. Depending on whether these potential new participants are relatively more prone to making errors than current participants, the higher error rate observed in the aforementioned studies could, at least in principle, be attributable to unintentional reporting errors.
Stamps have typically been around six to seven percent (U.S. Congress, 1998, Table 7-28, p. 466 and Table 15-7, p. 938) . However, such a comparison is potentially misleading, owing to the differences in the underlying populations and estimation methodologies. For instance, the AFDC and Food Stamp populations include a substantial number of households with no earnings (elderly, disabled, or non-working welfare recipients). 20 If the error rate calculations for these programs were restricted to households with earnings, the estimates would be considerably higher. In addition, the Food Stamp error rate is calculated ignoring the fi rst $300 of a household's annual mistaken claims, whereas the computation of the EITC error rate includes all erroneous claims.
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Even if these differences were accounted for, it is likely that the estimated overclaim rates for the EITC program would continue to exceed those for AFDC and Food Stamps; however, the difference would be less pronounced.
PARTICIPATION RATE
For households that are legally required to fi le a tax return, our data permit us to compute an EITC participation rate. As detailed in Table 1 , our TCMP tabulation for fi lers indicates that 5.88 million out of 6.26 million eligible households claimed the credit in tax year 1988. Further, we estimate that 347,000 eligible households with a fi ling requirement failed to submit a return and, hence, made no application for the EITC. This implies a participation rate of 5.88/(6.26+0.347), or 89 percent.
The TCMP data also permit us to estimate the number of eligible households without a legal fi ling obligation that submitted returns. There were approximately 877,000 such households in tax year 1988, and about 864,000 of them claimed the EITC on their returns. Unfortunately, the TCMP data do not contain any information on the number of eligible households with no fi ling requirement that elected not to submit a return. However, our best available estimate, based on our analysis of the 1989 Current Population Survey, is that there were between 2.22 and 2.82 million eligible households in tax year 1988 with no fi ling requirement (including both fi lers and non-fi lers), depending on whether we impose a rough proxy for the support test for a qualifying child. This would imply a participation rate of only between 30.6 and 39.0 percent for households without a legal fi ling obligation-well below our estimate for households that are required to fi le. Presumably, in the absence of a legal obligation, such households are less prone to fi ling a return and, hence, claiming the credit. Awareness of the program may also be lower among such households.
The above finding places the comparison of traditional welfare programs with the EITC in new light. Traditional programs, such as Food Stamps and the former AFDC program, target a large share of all benefi ts to low-income households with no legal fi ling requirement. For instance, we estimate using the Current Population Survey (CPS) that only roughly 17.8 percent of AFDC households in tax year 1996 (the year before AFDC was replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)) were required to fi le a return, compared to approximately 75 percent for the EITC.
22 Among house-holds with no legal fi ling obligation, our above estimate of the EITC participation rate suggests that the EITC may actually be less effective than traditional welfare programs in reaching those in need. For instance, Blank and Ruggles (1993) However, the estimated participation rate was substantially higher among individuals with no earnings (67 percent) than for those with earnings (50.5 percent).
Combining our estimates for households with and without a legal filing obligation, our overall estimate of the EITC participation rate for tax year 1988 is between 69.4 percent and 74.3 percent, depending on whether we impose a rough proxy for the support test for a qualifying child in our CPS sample of households without a legal fi ling requirement. This is well below the estimates of Scholz (1994) and Liebman (1996) for tax year 1990 (Scholz: between 80.5 and 86.4 percent, depending on whether a proxy for the support test is imposed; Liebman: 81.2 percent). Given that the EITC program changed very little between tax years 1988 and 1990, we suspect that this discrepancy in results is largely a consequence of a difference in estimation methodologies rather than an actual improvement in program participation.
As a check on our approach, we used the CPS to develop an independent estimate of the number of eligible households with a legal fi ling obligation in tax year 1988. The CPS-based estimate (between 6.87 million and 6.89 million, depending on whether a proxy support test is imposed) is only slightly larger than our TCMP-based estimate of 6.61 million. The consistency of these independent estimates gives us confi dence in the accuracy of the denominator of our participation rate estimate. Moreover, there is relatively little scope for error in the numerator of our estimate, as this is based on verifi ed administrative records concerning whether a family actually claimed the EITC on their tax return.
BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE TO RULE CHANGES
The EITC program has changed considerably since tax year 1988. To begin with, the average real value of the credit has more than doubled. In addition, the eligibility rules have been refi ned in an effort to target the credit more effectively towards needy families. A new means test based on the level of investment income became effective in tax year 1996 and was indexed to inflation. For tax year 1999, an otherwise eligible household with more than $2,350 from investments was not entitled to the credit. Also in tax year 1996, a modifi ed defi nition of AGI was introduced for computation of the credit that excluded certain losses from investments and businesses. However, the original AGI concept was reinstated in tax year 2002. Since tax year 1991, an eligible household with two or more qualifying children has been entitled to a larger benefi t than a comparable household with one qualifying child. Also as of that year, taxpayers with a "single" fi ling status have been permitted to claim the credit.
As described in the Appendix, we have used our econometric results to simulate the effects of the rule changes between tax years 1988 and 1999 on EITC program participation among households with a legal filing requirement. The results are presented in Table 7 . The number of eligible households with a qualifying child (and also a legal fi ling obligation) increases from 6.61 million in tax year 1988 to 9.36 million in tax year 1999. We estimate that 9.06 million of the eligible households would fi le in 1999 year and that 8.82 million of them would actually claim the credit, for an implied participation rate of 94.2 percent, compared to 89 percent in tax year 1988. Much of the improvement in program participation is attributable to the impact of the substantially increased real value of the credit on a household's propensity to both fi le and claim the credit. According to our simulations, the average real value of the EITC (1988 dollars) increases from $521 to $1,293 for eligible households with one or more qualifying children under the tax year 1999 rules. A smaller portion of the improvement in EITC participation (1.2 percentage points) is attributable to changes in the size and composition of the population between tax years 1988 and 1999.
As a check on our simulation methodology, we have used data from an IRS study of EITC compliance for tax year 1999 to derive an independent estimate of the number of eligible claimants with a qualifying child who were required to fi le a return. Our estimate based on these data is that there were 9.13 million such claimants in tax year 1999. This fi gure is only about 3.5 percent larger than our simulation estimate of 8.82 million, well within the margin of error. 23 The consistency between these two estimates suggests that our econometric model does a reasonably good job of capturing the impact of the various substantial program changes between tax years 1988 and 1999 on the propensity for eligible households to fi le and claim the EITC.
From the CPS, we estimate that there were approximately 3.27 million eligible households with at least one qualifying child in tax year 1999 that did not have a legal fi ling obligation. Based on the IRS study of EITC compliance for tax year 1999, it appears that 1.64 million of these households fi led a return and claimed the credit, implying a participation rate of roughly 50 percent. This represents a substantial improvement in program take-up among households without a fi ling requirement relative to our tax year 1988 estimate of 31 to 39 percent. Nonetheless, their estimated participation rate is still fairly low and may very well be lower than participation rates within more traditional welfare programs. 23 Although we have not calculated the precise margin of error associated with the difference between our two estimates, the margin of error (α = .05) associated with our 9.13 million point estimate, alone, exceeds this difference. The overall margin of error for the difference between estimates is considerably larger than this, because it must take into account the statistical imprecision associated with the point estimate from our simulation as well that associated with our point estimate based on the IRS study of EITC compliance for tax year 1999. We would expect our simulation estimate to understate the actual number of participants in tax year 1999 to some extent, because our model does not account for the EITC outreach activities of the IRS, state governments, and non-profi t organizations during the 1990s.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit serves as an important case study for the delivery of social welfare benefi ts through the tax system. Advocates of the program tout the relatively high overall estimated participation rate and low administrative costs as evidence that the program is superior to more traditional welfare programs. Opponents, on the other hand, point to the relatively high rate of EITC noncompliance as evidence that the more intrusive elements of traditional welfare programs are required to prevent fraud and abuse. The results presented in this paper suggest that the arguments on both sides of the debate tend to be exaggerated. For instance, we fi nd that the aggregate EITC participation rate masks important differences among households with and without a legal fi ling obligation. Among households that are not required to fi le-the group that has made up the predominant share of the caseload for more traditional welfare programs such as AFDC and Food Stamps-it appears that EITC participation may actually be inferior to participation in these other programs. Indeed, the high overall rate of participation and low administrative costs associated with the EITC would seem largely due to the fact that the program is much more heavily targeted towards households that already have to fi le a tax return. In this regard, the EITC might best be viewed as a complement to traditional welfare programs rather than as a potential replacement for them.
In terms of compliance, estimates from the EITC program do indeed show sharply higher rates of noncompliance than estimates from more traditional welfare programs. However, the difference in estimates partly refl ects the differences in covered populations (especially the presence of many non-earners among the AFDC and Food Stamp populations) and estimation methodologies. If these differences were properly accounted for, estimates of noncompliance within the EITC program would most likely remain higher than those for the other programs, but the difference would be less pronounced.
Beyond estimating the overall degree of EITC program participation, we have estimated behavioral equations describing the determinants of participation and compliance among households with a legal fi ling requirement. Our results indicate that households are more likely to comply with their fi ling obligations when they are eligible for the EITC. Further, we fi nd that the likelihood of both fi ling a return and claiming the EITC is positively associated with the size of the credit. Eligible households with self-employment income are relatively less likely to fi le a return (and, hence, receive the credit), while those with prior fi ling experience or with income subject to information reporting are relatively more likely to fi le. Somewhat surprisingly, the use of tax preparation assistance does not appear to improve the likelihood that an eligible fi ler will claim the credit, once the role of sample selection is taken into account.
In addition to examining the characteristics of eligible participants, we have also explored the determinants of claims submitted by ineligible households. The results support our hypothesis that fi lers who satisfy some (but not all) of the EITC program requirements are relatively more likely to mistakenly infer they are eligible for the credit.
Many EITC participants employ a tax practitioner to assist them with claiming the credit. In response to a perception that tax practitioners were not doing enough to ensure compliance with the EITC, new regulations were introduced in 1997 that required them to undertake certain efforts to document their clients' eligibility. Our results for tax year 1988 support the perception that tax practitioners were not promoting compliance with the EITC. In particular, our results indicate that ineligible households that received tax assistance were actually more likely to claim the EITC than ineligible households that prepared their own returns.
The average benefi t under the EITC program has more than doubled in real terms since tax year 1988. Our simulations reveal that the degree of program participation among households with a fi ling requirement has improved in response to these more generous benefi ts, from 89 percent in 1988 to 94.2 percent in 1999. Based on a combination of survey and tax audit data, it appears that program participation may have improved even more dramatically over this period among households without a fi ling requirement. Our best estimate is that the take-up rate increased from somewhere in the range of 31 to 39 percent in tax year 1988 to approximately 50 percent in tax year 1999. However, it appears that the burden of fi ling a return continues to deter many households without a legal fi ling obligation from participating. A lack of program awareness may also be a factor.
for our TCMP sample of fi lers and non-fi lers. For tax year 1999, a qualifying child had to meet certain relationship, residency, and age requirements. Unfortunately, the TCMP data do not contain the necessary information to conduct an exact test of these conditions. As our proxy measure for the number of qualifying children, we employ the examiner-recorded value for the number of exemptions for children living at home, with one exception. Specifically, if the TCMP examiner concluded that a household with no dependent child exemptions was entitled to the EITC in tax year 1988, we assume that the household had one qualifying child. Based on the above tests, we select the subsample of all households with qualifying children that meet the (infl ation-adjusted) tax year 1999 eligibility requirements for the EITC. The sum of the sample weights for this group represents our estimate of the number of tax year 1988 households with qualifying children that would be eligible for the credit under the tax year 1999 provisions and would be legally required to fi le a return.
Next, we age our subsample to make it broadly representative of the EITC-eligible population in tax year 1999 using a methodology previously developed by Erard (2001) for aging the TCMP data. This methodology involves adjusting the relevant sample weights and characteristics of our 1988 TCMP subsample to refl ect the changes in comparable subsamples of CPS households between tax years 1988 and 1999. The next step is to apply the econometric results from our behavioral model to simulate the number of eligible households that would fi le a return and claim the EITC under the tax year 1999 provisions. For each member of our aged TCMP subsample of eligible households (per tax year 1999 law) with a legal fi ling obligation, we estimate the probability of fi ling a return as: Similarly, the joint probability that a household would fi le, prepare its own return, and claim the EITC is computed as:
The sum of the two probability expressions in equations [A2] and [A3] represents the joint probability of fi ling and claiming the EITC under the tax year 1999 provisions. The weighted sum of the simulated joint probabilities of fi ling and claiming the EITC over all households in our subsample represents our estimate of the number of eligible households with a qualifying child (and also a legal fi ling obligation) that would participate in the program under the tax year 1999 rules. The ratio of this fi gure to our estimate of the number of eligible households with a qualifying child yields our estimate of the participation rate.
